


















Since the 1960s, relations between the EU and India have developed rapidly. Nowadays, 
EU–India relations have a strong institutional architecture, including regular summits 
(political and commercial), meetings of ministers and senior officials and so on. Within 
this institutional framework, the EU and India have launched a comprehensive and 
fruitful cooperation. There is much active political collaboration, such as in the reform of 
the United Nations and the fight against terrorism, based on common values. Trade and 
investment between the EU and India are experiencing strong growth but lack symmetry. 
What are the reasons behind the EU’s drive to advance relations with India so quickly? 
This paper identifies a number of factors involved. It examines the EU’s drive to deepen 
its ties with potential economic powers, enhance its influence in the international 
community in general and avoid an overly dependent trade relationship with China. The 
author then assesses the potential impact of the EU’s efforts to forge stronger relations 
with India from the perspectives of the EU and India, as well as the side effects for the 
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PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS 
FENG GENG
* 
(Summary of text in Chinese) 
Since the 1960s, there have been five stages in the evolution of relations between Europe and 
India, as outlined below:   
•  In 1963 diplomatic relations were established between India and the European Economic 
Community (EEC).   
•  During the 1970s, the Commercial Cooperation Agreement launched bilateral economic 
ties between India and the EEC.   
•  The 1980s saw a deepening of economic relations through the five-year Commercial and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement and its subsequent renewal.   
•  In the 1990s, the Partnership and Development Cooperation Agreement went beyond 
economic ties towards building relations centred on partnership. The European 
Commission’s Communication on An EU–India Enhanced Partnership
1 is another 
important document reflecting relations at this stage.   
•  As the 21
st century began, the first-ever EU–India Summit was held in 2000. Four years 
later, the EU and India decided to forge a comprehensive, strategic partnership.   
Nowadays, EU–India relations have a strong institutional architecture, including regular 
summits (political and commercial), meetings of ministers and senior officials and so on. Within 
this institutional framework, the EU and India have launched a comprehensive and fruitful 
cooperation. There is much active political collaboration, such as in the reform of the United 
Nations and the fight against terrorism, based on common values. Trade and investment 
between the EU and India are rapidly increasing but lack symmetry. 
What are the reasons behind the EU’s drive to progress relations with India so quickly? This 
paper argues that there are four factors involved.   
First, there is a natural desire for the EU to extend its relations given its own development and 
expansion. Today, the EU’s 25 states cover an area of 3,973,000 square kilometres and a 
population of 459.5 million. The EU is the largest economic entity in the world – even more so 
than the US. At the same time, the EU’s society is more stable than that in other regions. The 
prosperity and stability of its interior result in the motivation to have greater influence on 
international affairs. Thus the EU must develop a closer partnership with the major powers or 
potential powers of the world. India is just one of these powers. Since the reforms of the 1990s, 
the size of the Indian economy has grown to €771.95 billion in 2005, ranking 11
th in the world, 
with annual average GDP rising at a rate of more than 6%.
2 Considering its huge size, its 
population of more than a billion and its important geographical location, India has the 
possibility to become a powerful actor in the future. Therefore it is natural, reasonable and 
sensible that the EU enhances its relations with India. 
                                                        
* Feng Geng is a PhD candidate at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and a 
Visiting Fellow at CEPS. The views contained in this paper are those of the author only. 
1  See European Commission, Communication on An EU–India Enhanced Partnership, COM(96) 275 final, Brussels, 
26 June 1996. 
2 See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, World Economic and Financial Surveys, 
IMF, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2006 (retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/ 
weoselser.aspx?a=&c=534&t=1). 2 | FENG GENG 
 
Second, there is a big prospective market in India. Although India has an enormous population, 
the EU’s trade with India only comprises 1.8%
3 of the total trade between the EU and the rest 
of the world. Also, the share of the service trade with India is very low, at only 1.1%
4 of the 
EU’s total. There should be a very broad space to develop trade relations with India. The 
situation for investment in India is similar. In 2004, FDI investment flows into India only 
totalled €1.1 billion, a figure that reflects a mere 0.9%
5 of the EU’s entire FDI outflows. 
Furthermore, the construction of basic infrastructure in India is occurring on a vast scale, which 
urgently needs investment, equipment and technology. Meanwhile, India’s defence budget has 
risen sharply in recent years as well as the level and scale of its weapons purchase. India has 
been buying a great deal of weapons from European firms in France and Germany for example, 
which has been a source of significant income to these countries. Finally yet importantly is the 
field of high technology. In this regard, there is strong demand in India, as for example the 
boom in its aviation sector has resulted in the need for aircraft and thus opportunities for the 
French firm Airbus. India’s intentions to advance its technology are also evident in the 
agreement about India’s participation in the EU’s Galileo project, which will bring major 
benefits to the EU in all aspects. 
Third, there is the American factor, which features two opposing trends. One is that the 
orientation of American foreign policy towards India influences the orientation of EU policy. As 
US–India relations grow closer, so too do EU–India relations. Two cases in point are the EU’s 
initiative to hold a summit with India and the subsequent forging of a strategic partnership, and 
the issue of a joint declaration for the development of civil, nuclear energy cooperation. All 
these activities came on the heels of steps taken by the US. In this sense, the EU is following the 
US. But that is not the whole story. In fact, the EU has its own purposes in strengthening ties 
with India. The American tendency towards unilateralism has forced the EU to seek more 
partners to counter this situation. In this sense, the EU has been deviating from the US. How did 
these contradictory trends arise? This paper holds that it reflects the inherent contradiction of 
EU–US relations. On the one hand, the EU and the US are joint stakeholders with regard to 
economic, political and security matters. In many cases, the EU has to be in accord with the US 
because the US more powerful, especially in the military field. On the other hand, these two 
actors have different opinions about the future structure of the world. The EU wants to solidify 
and enhance its influence on the international community, as it seeks a multipolar world, while 
the US envisages the opposite. 
Finally, there is the Chinese factor. This factor also has two aspects. Balancing the influence of 
China in Asia is the first of these. China’s ideology and regime are different from that of 
Western countries. Unfortunately, the EU gives much attention and emphasis to this point. Thus, 
there is a perception that a strong, democratic India is the best way to balance China. Avoiding 
the risks of the EU’s over-dependence on China in trade and economic affairs is the second 
aspect. Trade and economic relations between the EU and China are very close. The EU is the 
most significant trade partner to China and China is the second-most important trade partner to 
the EU. In 2005, 30.65% 
6of the EU’s textile and clothing imports came from China. Changes 
in Chinese domestic affairs or in EU–China relations are likely to have a marked impact on the 
EU. Under the heading of ‘don’t put all your eggs into one basket’, it can be surmised that 
‘made in India’ is the best substitute for ‘made in China’ in terms of goods that are low cost, 
exhibit good design, have high investment efficiency and so on.   
The development of EU–India relations is influential on four levels. On the first level, EU–India 
relations can promote progress for both sides, including economic prosperity and the elevation 
                                                        
3  See Eurostat (Comext, Statistical regime 4). 
4  Ibid. (excluding government service). 
5 See the European Commission’s website article, “Bilateral Trade Relations with India”, Brussels, October 2006, 
(retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/india/index_en.htm) 
6  Eurostat (Comext, Statistical Regime 4). PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 3 
 
of international positions. On a second level, the strengthening of EU–India relations is helpful 
to the stability and development of the respective regions. India supports the enlargement of the 
EU and the EU undertakes efforts to support peace in southern Asia. Moreover, their joint work 
to fight terrorism facilitates the respective regions’ security and stability. On a third level there is 
the beneficial creation of new international structures. The EU and India have common views 
on international structures in the future, being that they should be in a multipolar and not in a 
unipolar world. The EU is helping India to advance; as it does so, India can contribute more to 
this process. At the same time, EU–India cooperation in the framework of the World Trade 
Organisation also helps the development and improvement of the multilateral trade system. 
On a further level, concerning the impact of EU–India relations on China, as a popular saying 
goes, ‘every coin has two sides’. There are two different kinds of influences related to China – 
positive and negative. On one side, the development of EU–India relations is in line with 
Chinese interests. Today, China is evolving at a rapid pace and the most important thing for 
China is a peaceful international context. The progression of relations between the EU and India 
is helpful to regional as well as world peace and stability. In this sense, China welcomes the 
process. On the other side of the coin, advances in the ties between the EU and India will have 
some negative side effects on China in the future. At first, India will have a greater share of the 
FDI flowing from the EU, affecting trade between the EU and China, especially in 
manufactured products. These issues will become increasingly serious for China with the 
growth of the Indian economy. Furthermore, there are some major potential problems in 
relations between India and China in the longer term:   
1)  Territorial disputes. India and China engaged in a territorial war in 1962. The national 
boundaries between China and India have yet to be confirmed. 
2)  The partnership between Pakistan and China. China is an ‘all-weather’ partner for 
Pakistan. Whenever conflicts erupt between India and Pakistan, China always stands with 
Pakistan. Naturally, New Delhi does not enjoy that.   
3)  Sea transportation lines for oil imports into China – the Indian Ocean and the Malacca 
Straits. The Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean are the most important transportation 
routes for oil imports from the Middle East and Africa to China. About 80% of imported 
oil must be transported to China through this ‘life line’. As we all know, these areas are 
mainly controlled by India. If disputes between India and China occur, the high degree of 
Chinese dependency on these transportation routes would put China at a disadvantage.   
4)  ‘The eastward strategy’ of India to develop closer military ties with Japan and the 
Southeast Asian nations. There are very complex historical problems between China and 
Japan. Tokyo’s denial of guilt in the treatment of ordinary Chinese people by Japanese 
militarists during World War II causes further deterioration in the relations between China 
and Japan. In this context, it is understandable that Beijing is wary of the development of 
relations between India and Japan. There are also some intractable issues between 
Southeast Asian nations and China, such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It 
should be noted that Japan and the Southeast Asian nations do not belong to the 
traditional, strategic domain of India. So India’s eastward strategy seems more like some 
kind of tactic for surrounding China. 
Moreover, these potential problems will become increasingly grave with the EU’s growing 
support of India, especially in the military and political fields. The sale of advanced weapons to 
India – which have never been sold to China – and the EU’s firm political support of India 
during its conflicts with Pakistan will make India stronger and more resilient. There is no doubt 

























立战略伙伴关系，其发展大约以 10 年为一个阶段。1，揭开序幕。上世纪 60 年代PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 5 
 
（1963 年）印度与欧洲经济共同体建交，成为最早与之建立外交关系的国家之一，
现代欧印关系拉开序幕。2，启动经济合作。欧印建交 10 年后，1973 年双方签订
《商务合作协定》 ，欧印经济合作启动。3，合作扩大深化。欧印关系在上世纪 80
年代进一步发展。 1981 年 11 月 16 日欧印签署为期 5 年的 《商务和经济合作协定》 ，
这是双方间的第二代合作协定，经济合作扩大深化。1985 年双方签署新的商务和
经济合作协定，欧印合作的势头加强。4，突破经贸合作。90 年代初冷战结束，欧


















                                                        
7  See European Commission, Communication on An EU–India Enhanced Partnership, COM(96) 275 final, Brussels, 



















升。据 2005 年 11 月欧洲委员会资料统计，欧印高级官员会议，已举行了 9 次会
议；欧洲委员会和印方策划者会议，已召开 3 次会议；多边论坛外的双边会议，
举行了两次有关生化武器的会议；专家工作组会议，已召开一次有关出口控制的




                                                        
8 See the European Commission’s website article, “The EU’s relations with India”, Brussels, November 2005 
(retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/intro/index.htm). PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 7 
 
除了这些定期会晤机制，欧印议会和高官互访制度也进一步加深了欧印政治
























                                                        
9  See European Commission, An EU-India Strategic Partnership, Commission Staff Working Document, COM(2004) 
430 final, Brussels, 16 June 2004, p. 8. 
10 See European Commission, The European Union in Partnership with India, Brussels, November 2004 (retrieved 
from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/library/publications/11_eu-india-2003.pdf). 


























                                                                                                                                                                    
2004 (retrieved from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/round_table.htm). 
12 See the article “Next EU–India Summit Planned for October in Helsinki”, Deutsche Welle, 8 August 2006 
(retrieved from http://www2.dw-world.de/southasia/eu-southasia/1.194681.1.html). 
13  See European Commission, Political Declaration on the India–EU Strategic Partnership, New Delhi, 7 September 
2005 (ret. from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/sum09_05/05_pol_decl_070905.pdf). 
14 See European Commission, Joint Declaration from the 1
st EU–India Summit held in Lisbon on 28 June 2000 
(retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/summit_06_00/joint_declaration.htm). PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 9 
 
程的关键伙伴” 。
15第 4 次峰会强调， “印度与欧盟由于民主政治的和多元社会的价
值观而结合在一起。 ”





















                                                        
15 See the article by Romano Prodi, “Heal the World – EU and India have a moral duty”, The Times of India, 23 
November 2001 (ret. from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/summits/second/article_prodi.htm). 
16  See the European Commission’s Delegation to India, “4
th EU–India Summit – Joint Press Statement”, New Delhi, 
29 November 2003 (retrieved from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/summits/fourth/107- 
joint-pr.htm). 
17 See European Commission, “Joint Press Statement for the 5
th India–EU Summit” held in The Hague on 8 
November 2004 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/sum11_04/js.pdf#search=%22 
Joint%20press%20statement%20for%205th%20India-eu%20summit%22).  
18 See the European Commission, India: Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006  & National Indicative Programme, 
Brussels, 10 September 2002 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/csp/index.htm). 10 | FENG GENG 
 























                                                        
19 See European Commission’s website article, “The EU’s relations with India”, subheading “EU/India Summit, 
Lisbon, 28 June 2000”, Brussels (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/summit_06_00/ 
joint_declaration.htm). 
20 See European Commission, “Joint Press Statement for the 5
th India–EU Summit”, Brussels, 8 November 2004 
(retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/sum11_04/js.pdf#search=%22Joint%20Press% 
20Statement%20for%205th%20India-EU%20Summit%22). 
21  See the European Commission’s Delegation to India, “4
th EU–India Summit – Joint Press Statement”, New Delhi, 
29 November 2003 (retrieved from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/summits/fourth/107- 






问题上，2005 年 12 月印度出兵参与维和，为欧盟在当地的艰难维和任务贡献一份
力量。对于阿富汗局势，欧盟和印度政府对卡尔扎伊过渡政府首先表示了道义上

















                                                        
22  See the European Commission’s Delegation to India, Political Declaration on the India–EU strategic partnership, 
New Delhi, 7 September 2005 (retrieved from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/summits/sixth/ 
political_declaration.pdf). 
23 See the European Commission’s Delegation to India, “Third EU India Summit: Joint Press Statement”, 
Copenhagen, 10 October 2002 (retrieved from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/summits/third/ 
joint_statement.htm). 








15 年间这一数字增长 9 倍有余，2005 年达到 400 亿欧元。最新资料显示，2004 年
印度对欧盟的出口为 132.4 亿欧元，占印度出口总额的 22%。印度从欧盟的进口为
137.7 亿欧元，占其进口总额的 17.3%。与欧盟的贸易总额占印度对外贸易总额的
19.4%，比其第二大贸易伙伴美国高出 8.6 个百分点。从增长率看，2000 年至 2004
年印度对欧盟出口年均增长 4.2%，进口年均增长 4.4%，贸易总量年均增长 4.3％。
2000 年至 2005 年欧盟从印度进口年均增长 9.0%，对印度出口增长 13.1%，总贸易
额年均增长 11.1%。至 2006 年 3 月，欧盟对印出口同比增加 14.5%，进口同比增
加 25.5%，总贸易额同比增加 19.9%，大大高出近几年的平均水平。
26欧印服务业
贸易近年来也快速增长。2003 年欧盟对印服务业出口为 27 亿欧元，进口为 30 亿









                                                        
25  European Commission’s Delegation to India, “4
th EU–India Summit – Joint Press Statement”, New Delhi, 29 
November 2003 (retrieved from http://www.delind.cec.eu.int/en/political_dialogue/summits/fourth/107-joint- 
pr.htm). 
26  以上数据来自 Eurostat (Comext, Statistical regime 4) 和 International Monetary Fund (Direction of Trade 
Statistics). 
27  Eurostat (excluding government service). 
28  Eurostat (excluding government service). PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 13 
 
欧盟对印直接投资主要集中在能源动力、电信和运输部门。2003 年，欧盟流入印
度的直接投资为 7 亿欧元，占印度外资来源的近 20%  ,是印度的第二大外国直接投
资来源，但却只占欧盟对外总投资额的 0.65%。2004 年欧盟对印直接投资增长为
11 亿欧元， 但仍只占欧盟对外总投资的 0.9%。 而印度对欧盟的直接投资增幅较大，


















等。同时将启用 3300 万欧元资助 1000 名印度学生到欧洲学习,建立欧印环境会议
等以加强社会、文化方面的联系与合作。为了显示其新建立的战略伙伴关系，双
                                                        
29 See European Commission’s website article, “Bilateral Trade Relations, India”, Brussels, 2006 (retrieved from 


















据报道，今年 10 月 13 日欧印将在赫尔辛基召开第 7 次首脑会议，将进一步落








                                                        
30 参见梁晓华： “欧印推动‘战略伙伴关系’合作” ， 《光明日报》 ，2004 年 11 月 11 日。 
31 参见林琳： “印度挤进‘伽利略’计划”,《世界新闻报》 ，2005 年 02 月 22 日 (retrieved from 
http://gb.chinabroadcast.cn/2201/2005/02/22/1405@456869.htm). 
32  See the article “Next EU–India Summit Planned for October in Helsinki”, Deutsche Welle, 8 August 2006 














洲一体化进入新阶段。2004 年，欧盟成功东扩，成员国从 15 国猛增到 25 国，欧
盟成员国的总面积达到 397.3 万平方公里，人口约 4.595 亿，整体国民生产总值
增加约 5%。 据 IMF 数据显示， 2005 年欧盟 25 国的国民生产总值为 13.5 万亿美元，






统。 “伽利略计划”将发射 30 颗在轨卫星以覆盖地球的每一寸土地，其定位精度
可以达到 1 米，高于美国 GPS 系统的 10 米。
34它的建成将提高欧洲在航天、电子、
                                                        
33 See the International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook Database, 
September 2006 Edition, IMF, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/weoselagr.aspx). 

























90 年初开始进行改革，平均经济增长率在 6%以上。2005 年更高达 8.5%，现价 GDPPERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 17 
 





现代化建设的步伐。2004-2005 财政年度印度防务预算为 146 亿美元，2005 至
2006 财政年度的国防预算则在此基础上提高约 10％。 国防预算的提高，
使印度有充足的资金从美、英、法、俄等国大量购买先进武器，包括 T-90 主

















                                                        
35 Ibid. 
36  此处“金刚钻”一词借用现代国际关系研究院傅小强语。见其“解读印度外交的嬗变” ， 《看世界》 ，2004
年 第2期 。  
37 参见闻煊： “印度洲际导弹能打到北极” ， 《环球时报》 ， 2005 年 09 月 02 日，第十二版。 
38 See European Commission, The European Union in Partnership with India, Brussels, November 2004 (retrieved 
from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/library/publications/11_eu-india-2003.pdf). 
39 See European Commission, Communication on An EU–India Strategic Partnership, SEC(2004) 768, Brussels, 16 


























                                                        
40 参见丁原洪：“欧盟的困惑与中欧关系”，《国际问题研究》，2006 年第 4 期，第 47 页。  
41 斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所编： 《SIPRI 年鉴 2005：军备、裁军和国际安全》 ，中国军控与裁军协会译，时



















紧密的新型伙伴关系” 。当年 11 月欧盟印度召开首次首脑会议，欧盟大幅提升与
印度的合作水平。2001 年美印开始提及建立“战略伙伴关系”问题。2004年1月
在美印领导人的联合声明中这种声调进一步提高，布什称与印度的“战略伙伴关
系正在成为现实” 。就在这一年 10 月欧盟正式决定将欧印关系提升为“战略伙伴
关系” ，11 月双方首脑会议上欧印“战略伙伴关系”正式确立。再看印度发展核技
术问题。印度至今没有签署《不扩散核武器条约》 ，按道理欧洲国家应该谨慎对待
和印度核合作的问题。其实不然。2005 年 7 月美印领导人发表联合声明表示要推
                                                        
42  参见“空中客车 A380 飞机又获 9 架新订单” ，新浪网，2006 年 07 月 24 日 (retrieved from 





展民用核能合作的联合宣言》 。今年 3 月初，布什访问印度时双方正式签署了《美





















                                                        
43 参见杨川：“英国将对印度放松民用核技术出口控制” ， 新华网，2005 年 08 月 12 日。 PERSPECTIVES ON EU–INDIA RELATIONS | 21 
 















至 2005 年， 中国 GDP 平均年增长率超过 9.4%， 最高达 14.2%， 2005 年为 9.0%。
452006







中国则是欧盟的第 2 大贸易伙伴。2003 年欧中还建立了“全面战略伙伴关系” ，中
                                                        
44  Eurostat (Comext, Statistical regime 4). 
45  See the International Monetary Fund,  数据库  (retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/ 
02/data/dbcsubm.cfm). 
46 参见王慧卿： “世界银行:中国已超过英国成为世界第四大经济体” ，新华网， 2006 年 07 月 04 日(retrieved 



















数据， “中国的经济增长是虚假的” ， “中国的经济即将崩溃” 。2002 年，法国里昂
证券公司发表报告，称中国的债务余额实际上是 GDP 的 1.4 倍，为中国政府公布
数据的 6 倍，若这一趋势得不到控制，中国最终将发生金融危机。
47欧盟与中国贸
易非常密切，相互依赖程度高。2005 年欧盟与中国的贸易总额达 2097.8 亿欧元，
占欧盟对外贸易总额的 9.4%。 欧盟从中国进口纺织品和服装总额达 215.6 亿欧元，
占此类商品进口总额的30.65%； 从中国进口的办公/电信设备总额达490.1亿欧元，
                                                        
47 参见何洪泽： “中国的繁荣是假象？‘中国崩溃论’出台之前前后后” ， 《环球时报》 ，2002 年 06 月 06 日，



























                                                        
48  Eurostat (Comext, Statistical Regime 4).   





















印度大国理想的实际帮助。英国外相斯特劳 2005 年 6 月在伦敦国际事务皇家学院
的会议上明确表示，“英国过去支持，现在支持，并将会继续支持印度申请加入联
合国安理会常任理事国。 ”
52而法国总统希拉克在 2004 年 11 月访问牛津大学时也
表示，增加安理会常任理事国席位，印度应当是其中之一。 
当然， 欧印间并非只有合作没有摩擦， 但欧印矛盾目前集中在少量贸易纠纷上。
                                                        
50 参见于海莲：“关注印度经济：成就与问题”， 《求是》 ，2004 年 15 期。 
51  国家发改委对外经济研究所： “中国对外贸易依存度究竟高不高” ， 《中国改革报》 ，2006 年 8月 22 日，第
六版。 
52  “英将加强与印度关系 公开支持印‘入常’ ” ，人民网，2005 年 06 月 28 日 (retrieved from 


























                                                        
53  See European Commission, The India–EU Strategic Partnership: Joint Action Plan, New Delhi, 7 September 2005 



























                                                        





















超过 12.5％的“毕业门槛” ，此类商品的关税上升了 3 个百分点，导致产品成本的
进一步增加。而同样具有大规模棉花种植地的印度，正以其独有的优势成为“中
国制造”未来可能的替代者。1，印度经济尚处于“起飞”阶段，劳动力成本的比
较优势大。据 2003 年统计的数据显示，印度服装业工资平均为 0.57 美元/小时，
而中国沿海地区平均为 0.69 美元/小时。随着中国经济的不断“成长” ，到今天这
一差距只会加大不会缩小。2，印度纺织业设计出众，产品也多以时装和制成品为
                                                        













资的 0.65%， 远低于欧盟对华投资。 但我们应当注意到， 欧盟对印投资上升速度快、
增幅大。2003 年欧盟对印直接投资为 7 亿欧元，04 年上升为 11 亿欧元，增幅为




学家普遍认为，近年印度年经济增长率为 6%左右，投资额为 GDP 的 24%，中国的






                                                        
56  参见《中国纺织报》 ， “1-7 月全国纺织品服装进出口概况” ，新浪网， 2006 年 9 月 7 日 (retrieved from 
http://chanye.finance.sina.com.cn/fz/2006-09-07/298682.shtml). 
57  See European Commission’s website (retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/may/ 



























                                                        





































                                                        
59  See European Commission’s website (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/india/docs/ 
chart_en.pdf). About CEPS
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